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LOGIC AND PROOF FOR MATHEMATICIANS
A TWENTIETH CENTURY PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
If there is one aspect of mathematics education that frustrates both
students and t eacher.s .alike , it has .got, to be learning how to do valid proofs.
Students often feel they really know the mathematics they're studying but that
their teachers place some unr-easonab.Ly strin,gent demands upon their arguments.
Teachers, on the other hand, can't understand where their students get some of
the wacky arguments they come up with. They argue in circles, they end up
proving a different result from what they claim, they make false statements,
they draw invalid inferences - it can be quite exasperating at times!
Unfortunately, constructing a genuine demonstration is not a side issue in
mathematics; deduction forms the backbone and hygiene of mathematical
intercourse and simply must be learned by mathematics majors.
I'd like to focus attention on this topic in this paper first by sharing
with you how we 'attack the problem at Dordt. ,I will then attempt to give the
issue a bit of historical and philosophical depth by tracing some developments
in mathematics and logic which seem to have had a strong influence upon
contemporary approaches to teaching proof. I hope this will contribute to
further discussion of the problem. The issue is a perennial one and should be
faced squarely by mathematics educators.
At Dordt I teach a one semester, sophomore level course for mathematics
majors called MATHEMATICAL PROOF AND THE THEORY OF CALCULUS. At the time when
students take this course they have already had two semesters of calculus,
which they took along with a number of other majors. Dordt doesn't have
enough mathematics majors to justify teaching a section of calculus just for
them, so they take a course which could be characterized as calculus for
scientists and engineers. As you all know, such a course is largely
algorithmic or cookbok-ish in nature; proof is largely absent - though the
engineers in my class never fail to state on their year-end evaluations that I
spend far too much 'time on proofs (read: hand-waving plausibility arguments)
and not enough time on examples (read: model problems to be followed
mechanically in doing'the homework).
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In the sophomore 'year we try'to make amends for this lack of rigor by
taking our majors aside and teaching them calculus a second time. This time
the theoretical aspects of calculus are highlighted; here we do the theory up
"right" with epsilon's and delta's, definitions, theorems, and proofs. The
course content is drawn primarily from differential calculus; we venture into
integral calculus only to prove the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, and
sequences and series barely get mentioned. Now, if you add up all the time
needed to teach this much theory, you come up about half a semester short.
Rather than beef up the course and infringe upon the content of the upper
level real analysis course, we decided upon a more imaginative solution: why
not spend the first half of the course learning some elementary logic and
mathematical proof strategies? Since students invariably have trouble when
they hit courses that require proof making skills, why not prime them a bit by
giving them a peek at the various proof techniques mathematicians carry around
in their toolkits and letting them try these techniques out on some familiar
mathematics, such as the calculus they already know and some other, more
elementary mathematics?
Such a course presents a pretty problem for the instructor, however.
What text should be used for such a hybrid? Well, the introductory calculus
text supplemented by class notes should suffice for the second half of the
course, but what about the first half on logic and mathematical proof? It
just so happened that there was a booklet at hand which addressed precisely
this need: Marvin Bittinger's LOGIC, PROOF, AND SETS (1970; 1982). This was
used for a couple of years at Dordt without too much complaint, but when I
began teaching the course in 1983, I decided to tryout the recent book by
Daniel Solow which had been promoted at the annual AMS / MAA meetings, HOW TO
READ AND DO PROOFS (1982).
Unfortunately, for all the merits of the book, Solow still leaves a
number of things out of his discussion of mathematical proof, and some of what
he does have is a bit confused according to a logician's way of thinking. So
it turned out that this part of the course also needed instructor input by way
of supplemental notes and corrective remarks. Since I also teach an
introductory logic course for the philosophy department, it was natural for me
to try to incorporate some things from that course into my course on
mathematical proof. One of the books I was using there to orient myself to
philosopher's logic (never having taken such a course) was THE LOGIC BOOK
(1980) by Bergmann, Moor, and Nelson. This text stresses a natural deduction
system and a deduction schema for formal argumentation which derives
ultimately from the ideas of Gentzen and Jaskowski in the mid 1930's but
more immediately from the 1952 textbook, SYMBOLIC LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION,
written by F. B. Fitch. Coming out of a background in mathematical logic,
where a deduction system is set up almost solely to do metamathematics, I
found their presentation both interesting and novel. As I mulled over the
various natural deduction rules of inference, I became keenly aware of how
nicely they paralleled the way mathematicians actually argue. And I became
less happy with both Solow and Bittinger for teaching proof.
,
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Having a better idea of what I wanted to do in the course, I began to
scout around for another textbook, but with no success. There didn't seem to
be any other books in print which aimed to teach mathematics students the art
of proof making. There were lots of philosopher's logic texts which dealt
with deductive argumentation, but they naturally didn't stray into
mathematics. And there were a number of mathematical logic texts, but they
were designed primarily with foundational issues in mind and so usually didn't
discuss mathematical argumentation, only metalogical and metamathematical
results.
In a moment of frustration and weakness, I decided to write my own
textbook for the course, but I wondered why I should have to. Why were there
so few booklets for what I wanted? Presumably because Dordt's way of making
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the transition to more advanced mathematics was unique. No market, no
product. But why wasn't there a market for such a book? Mathematics is
admittedly much more than proof and formalism, but ever'y student of
mathematics has to learn how to read and write proofs. Do mathematical
educators think that logic is irrelevant to accomplishing this task? Really??
If so, why? There must be a good story behind all this, I thought. What is
it? Naturally, this called for some historical journalism.
In good journalistic fashion, I will be more tentative and tantalizing
than definitive and detailed. A fussier, more substantial paper would take
longer to develop and give, and at any rate does not presently exist. As your
reporter, I will trace the story back to some possible sources, but I will not
attempt to nail the culprits with incontrovertible evidence. Nevertheless, I
will not pretend to be completely neutral. As you will detect from my
account, I think the mathematical community's track record on this issue is
less than laudatory.
I will begin by briefly discussing a contemporary negative response to
the thesis that logic ought to be used to teach students how to read and write
mathematical proofs. Following this, I will survey the way in which
mathematics and logic have gotten along in the past. I will then make some
summary remarks about what nineteenth and twentieth century mathematicians
have come to expect (and not to expect) from logic. Finally, I will draw some
educational conclusions from the narrative and explain what I think can be
done to go beyond our present practice in addressing the problem of learning
how to do proof.
A FIRST ROUND ON THE ISSUE
A number of practicing mathematicians over the past twenty five years
have been turned off by the trend in education to formalize and "rigorize" all
of mathematics. They believe that the push for more rigor has been overdone,
even on the undergraduate level. For them, concern over rigorous argument and
axiomatic foundations is more like nitpicking than doing real mathematics.
They admit that mathematics involves deductive reasoning, but argue that this
is not its essence. Moreover. they believe that this aspect of mathematics is
best learned the way a medieval apprentice learned his trade: by watching and
doing. One need only stir the quiescent coals of the students' innate power
to reason and fan them to a hot flame by providing proper model~ to be
emulated and giving gentle correction to their first attempts. People knew
how to reason before Aristotle and Frege! Archimedes and Newton required no
detailed study of logic before they were able to demonstrate their
mathematical results.
Paul Halmos puts the argument rather nicely.
article he wrote a little over a decade ago in the
~IATHEMATICS MAGAZINE, entitled "Logic from A to G"
GBodel] :
Let me quote from an
January 1977 issue of
[i.e. Aristotle to
Originally "logic" meant the same as "the laws of thought" and
logicians studied the subject in the hope that they could teach
these arts to all mankind. Experience has shown, however, that
this is a wild-goose chase. A normal healthy human being has
RELATION BETWEEN LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
built in him all the "laws of thought" anybody has ever invented,
and there is nothing that logicians can teach him about thinking
and avoiding error. This is not to say that he knows how he thinks
and it is not to say that he never makes errors. The situation is
analogous to the walking equipment all normal healthy human beings
are born with. I don't know how I walk, but I do it. Sometimes I
stumble. The laws of walking might be of interest to physiologists
and physicists; all I want to do is to keep on walking.
Ilaimos is not denigrating proof and reasoning here, though he would certainly
want to stress that mathematics is much more than that. He just thinks that
logic has almost nothing to offer the mathematics student, even on this
limited front. Mathematical reasoning is an art, not a science; one cannot
prescribe set rules for its application.
By way of a personal response, let me first substitute a fairer analogy
for Halmos's walking-being. Take someone who wishes to become an accomplished
painter. It is quite possible that he or she can become an artist without
ever receiving formal training in perspective, color, shading, composition,
various media, etc. Yet native abilities in these aspects of the trade can be
corrected and sharpened by means of conscious study, and art schools subject
their students to just such a training. I believe that mathematics
departments should provide a similar service for their majors. In claiming
that mathematical educators have a responsibility to help their students learn
how to construct valid arguments, I wish to say no more than that they must
awaken and sharpen abilities which are already present. This must naturally
be done by means of much practice and correction - nobody disputes that - but
I think it should be assisted by a close study of the common proof strategies
used in mathematical reasoning.
A question which is still in order at this point concerns the means of
such a study. Is logic the appropriate foundation on which to build such an
art? I assume that it is, but why doesn't everyone agree? What makes
mathematicians like Halmos and others turn away from logic? I'd like to offer
a partial answer from the history of mathematics. So we will now turn to
trace some of the history of the inter-relationships between logic and
mathematics.
Mathematics, even axiomatically organized mathematics, existed before any
system of logic was invented. In fact, Aristotle, who is the undisputed
father of logic, seems to have drawn upon mathematics for inspiration and
ideas as he developed his system of syllogistic reasoning and his theory that
true science should be organized aXiomatically. In return, his compatriot
Euclid of a generation later seems to have adhered to Aristotle's view
concerning how a demonstrative science like geometry should be structured,
though he did not attempt to cast his proofs in the form of linked syllogisms.
Notwithstanding this lack of orthodoxy, for over two thousand years
mathematics, and particularly Euclidean geometry, was taken to be the primary
prototype of "logical" reasoning, for it was thought that if its arguments
were laid out in picky detail they would become strings of syllogisms. Up
until the nineteenth century, then, Aristotle's system of logic was generally
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acknowledged to be the underlying logic for all deductive reasoning,
mathematical or otherwise, though it might need to be expanded slightly to
accommodate a few forms of reasoning that Aristotle had overlooked.
Scientists and mathematicians of the early modern era, however, turned
their backs upon deductive logic, deeming it sterile and scholastic,
unproductive of new truths. Their interest was in generating new discoveries,
and this was done by means of experimentation and symbolic calculations, not
by disputation or deductive argumentation, and certainly not by chains of
syllogistic arguments. There was thus a conscious rejection of traditional
logic by the leading thinkers of the age.
In mathematics, the chasm widened between logic and mathematical
practice. It is well known that mathematics became less logically cohesive
with the genesis and development of analysis in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. The practice of mathematics belied its logical reputation to such
an extent that the ideas and techniques of the calculus were criticized (with
a large measure of justification) by Berkeley and others as vague and
contradictory.
It might be suspected that mathematics and logic would be brought
together again once the foundations of mathematics were shored up and made
more rigorous, but this is not quite the way it happened. The arithmetization
of analysis accomplished by Cauchy, Weierstrass, Cantor, and Dedekind provided
a firm theoretical foundation of mathematical concepts on which to erect the
calculus, but the logical structure of analysis went largely unexamined, and
the fields of logic and mathematics were not really drawn closer together by
all this work. Logic did play an important role in the axiomatization of
geometry effected by Pasch, Hilbert, and others around the end of the
nineteenth century, but by this time mathematics and logic had already begun
rapproachment along another path, one involving, of all fields, elementary
algebra, which lacked both logical rigor and a proper foundation.
It was in England about 1850, arising out of the work of Augustus
De Morgan and George Boole, that a tighter link between logic and mathematics
began to be forged. Prior to this time, logic and mathematics had been kept
apart in Great Britain, though lip service was still paid to mathematics as
the great model of logical reasoning. As a matter of fact, the two great
English universities had more or less divided up mathematics and logic between
them and gone their separate ways. For while Oxford and Cambridge were both
dedicated to teaching Christian gentlemen to think and converse rationally,
they differed widely over how this was to be accomplished. At Oxford students
were taught Aristotelian logic and were required to dispute various theses pro
and con in strict syllogistic form, while in Cambridge logic and disputation
had given way to an increased emphasis upon the study of mathematics as the
model of exact reasoning. Contemporary attitudes toward the value of logic
for learning how to do mathematical proofs find definite precedents in this
split between Oxford and Cambridge.
De Morgan, though trained at Cambridge, abandoned its narrow outlook. He
held that mathematics students could profit from a knowledge of the various
kinds of valid arguments, so he urged fellow mathematicians to acquaint
themselves with logic, which at that time was still a variant of Aristotelian
logic. His writings repeatedly espoused this theme, and he attempted to
develop a new and expanded system of logic.
George Boole, a self-taught mathematician and a friend of De Morgan, was
stimulated by certain events (which we cannot recount here) to make a fresh
investigation of logic for himself. Boole's genius was to use algebraic or
symbolic computations to calculate the consequences of a set of given
statements. Although he was not aware of it, his work provided partial
fulfillment of Leibniz's dream a century and a half earlier about inventing an
instrument by means of which two people could sit down to calculate the truth
of any matter.
Boolean logic brought mathematics and logic into very close contact, but
the way in which the two fields were connected kept numerous philosophers and
traditional logicians at arm's length. The main stumbling block for them was
the artificiality and partial uninterpretability of Boole's mathematical
method of generating conclusions from premises. In keeping with the spirit of
his time, Boole claimed that his system of logic had uncovered the true laws
of thought, but its deductive apparatus failed to parallel the way people
ordinarily reason, in mathematics or daily discourse. For this reason, many
viewed his system more as a strange system of algebra than as a serious
competitor to Aristotelian logic. Nevertheless, Boole did attract a number of
mathematically minded followers, and through his work and that of his
successors Jevons, Peirce, and Schr6der, who incorporated a number of ideas
from De Morgan's system as well, mathematical logic was successfully born.
Before the time of Boole and De Morgan, logic had been the sole domain of
academic philosophers; after their work, mathematicians increasingly claimed
logic as their own, as a branch of mathematics worthy of study, much like
geometry, algebra, or analysis.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Gottlob Frege proposed
another kind of connection between mathematics and logic. Frege intended to
define all the primitive concepts of mathematics in terms of logical concepts
and then prove the first principles of mathematics as theorems of logic.
Logic had a dual role to play in this logicist program of foundations: it was
both content (conceptual foundation) and method (rigorous derivation).
Frege's approach to relating mathematics and logic was novel in both regards.
In order to guarantee fully rigorous derivations, Frege restricted himself to
certain rules of inference, expressly stated at the outset. In order to show
that mathematics was merely complex logic, Frege was also obliged to provide
an adequate foundation of logical laws from which to derive mathematical
propositions. It is this last aspect, logic as conceptual and theoretical
basis, which seems to have received the most press in Frege's logicist
philosophy of mathematics, but the other was also very important. Before
Frege's work, the goal of logical rigor or deductive completeness was more
rhetoric than reality in mathematics; after it, it became a real possibility.
Notwithstanding this connection between logic and proof, Frege's work did
not analyze mathematical demonstration as it is practiced by mathematicians.
In fact, given his outlook that inference must always proceed from true
premises, Frege tended to slight conditional and indirect proofs, two of the
most important strategies of mathematical argumentation. Moreover, in the
process of reacting to psychologism in logic, Frege showed an unconcern for
having logic's deduction system mirror the way in which valid arguments
actually proceed, in mathematics or elsewhere. Frege was adamant that logic
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studies logical relationships among true propositions, not the laws of
thought, conceived of as the rules governing the way people ordinarily reason.
While logic was taken to be the underlying foundation for mathematics, then,
it was not expected to furnish the underlying logic for mathematical
argumentation.
Early in the twentieth century Bertrand Russell discovered that Frege's
system entailed a crucial contradiction. Learning of this flaw, Frege
attempted to root it out, but without success. He finally abandoned his
approach altogether. Russell, on the other hand, retained his faith in the
logicist program. Working with Alfred North Whitehead, Russell modified and
extended it in their three volume work, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA. Using Peano's
superior logical notation, they were able to bring it to the attention of many
mathematicians and logicians. They developed their system in elaborate
detail, going quite beyond Frege's work in an attempt to substantiate their
approach. On the matter of coordinating logic with ordinary mathematical
reasoning, however, Russell made no advance over Frege.
In the meantime two other approaches to the foundations of mathematics
had begun to flourish. They also had something to say about the proper
relationship between logic and mathematics. The intuitionist philosophy of
mathematics developed by Brouwer denied that logic had much of a role to play
at all. It certainly did not provide the theoretical foundation of
mathematics, but it also could not capture the mathematical process.
Mathematics was a creative enterprise which could not be contained within the
bounds of logic.
David Hilbert, on the other hand, sought to clarify and extend the role
of logic with respect to mathematics. Whether or not logic was taken to be
the proper conceptual foundation for mathematics was in some sense irrelevant
to the formalist program of mathematics which he was developing. Regardless
of its origin or intended meaning, the axiomatic foundation of a mathematical
theory should be considered to be a set of uninterpreted sentences, a series
of symbols combined in certain allowable ways and adopted as the axioms of
that system. Logic would enter this stage of the formalist program in three
ways: by explicitly stipulating the ways in which symbols could be combined
(the syntax); by contributing certain logical truths or tautologies as axioms
to be used within the system; and by providing the rules of inference by means
of which theorems could be proved (the deduction system). To this point
Hilbert merely adopted what had been done by the logicists.
Once a theory was set up, however, logic would be given a completely new
role to play, one that had only been hinted at before. It was Hilbert's
intent to investigate the metamathematical properties of a theory. The key
prerequisite of all theories was that they be logically consistent, but
Hilbert was also concerned with the notions of independence and completeness.
In order to show that a theory had or did not have such properties, Hilbert
and others developed proof theory and the method of interpreting sentences in
terms of models, both of which came to be considered integral parts of
mathematical logic. Logic thus not only had the old internal task of
logically unfolding a deductive theory, but the new external task of
demonstrating that the theory as given had various metamathematica1
properties.
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The ~ork of G6del and other mathematical logicians since 1930 has been
largely along the new lines of investigation opened up by Russell and by
Hilbert. With their ~ork, mathematical logic became a tool primarily for
analyzing the logical structure and capabilities of different systems of logic
and axiomatic theories. Mathematical logic became synonymous with
foundational investigations in logic and mathematics. Consequently, the
internal role of logic in developing a deductive theory became further
devalued, even molded to better suit the external role. Whether or not the
rules of inference of a given deduction system ~ere appropriate for developing
the theory was considered largely irrelevant, since formal systems were now
designed exclusively to facilitate foundational investigations. This led to
~hat are no~ termed "Hilbert-style" deduction systems (though they can be
traced back to Frege and Russell), in ~hich a number of tautologies are
adopted as axioms or laws of logic but relatively few rules of inference.
Suppositional rules of inference, which posit temporary suppositions to be
discharged before the end of the proof, make metalogical concerns such as the
soundness of the deductive system more complicated and thus are not usually
adopted in foundational investigations, though they are certainly used on the
metamathematical level (who reasons without them?) and even appear in the
guise of a metamathematical result, such as the deduction theorem.
EXPECTATIONS MATHEMATICIANS HAVE / DO NOT HAVE OF LOGIC
Given these developments in logic during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, it should be apparent that the time honored role of traditional
logic as providing the deep structure of deductive argumentation was gradually
eroded. It must be admitted that mathematics never did exhibit the strict
logical structure dictated to it by the logicians, so perhaps mathematicians
were simply used to thinking of rigor as being no more than irrelevant
rhetoric. Ironically enough, however, just as logic became more complex and
better able to fulfill this aim, it also grew away from it.
With Boolean logic we have a system for generating consequences, but one
which does not mirror the way in which arguments are actually made. Logicism
gave logic a more glamorous role to playas the theoretical foundation of
mathematics, and so turned attention away from the more pedestrian role it had
previously been thought to have. Derivations and rules of inference were
important, but only as a means to an end. Whether or not the deductions ~ere
artificial was not really relevant. Moreover, the deductions that were made
were so highly symbolic and detailed and proceeded as such a snail's pace that
they didn't look anything like the discourse mathematicians called
"reasoning". Finally, the exciting possiblities opened up for logic by the
formalist program proved so attractive and fertile that mathematicians and
logicians were bewitched into thinking that the only genuine way in which to
relate logic and mathematics was by way of foundational investigations. In
each case the original aim of logic was laid aside.
Thus, while nineteenth and t~entieth century developments drew
mathematics and logic increasingly closer together and provided a great boost
to the development of mathematical logic, even making this period a golden era
in the history of logic, it also gave a definite direction to the development
of logic and restricted the scope of the inter-connection between mathematics
and logic. Since the impulse to investigate logic now carnealmost completely
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out of foundational research, logic was seen as relevant primarily for
investigating metatheoretical issues. Its everyday relevance for doing
mathematics, for analyzing and formulating the underlying logic of
mathematical proof, was overshadowed and subverted by grander philosophical
and foundational programs.
Given this background, it is no wonder that few textbooks attempt to use
logic to train mathematics students in the art of proof making. Logic might
seem to be the natural choice, but mathematicians have not been adequately
shown the relevance and value of logic for this task. Mathematical logicians
have had more important things on their agendas, and so the mathematical
community has been left without their expert input on this matter. This is so
in spite of the fact that there are a number of good textbooks in mathematical
logic which one can draw upon. For, since these books are slanted toward
metalogical and metamathematical concerns, educators who look to them for
guidance on this matter find little there, and what they do find are often the
wrong things. The deduction systems in such books are embryonic and
unnatural, hardly what is needed for teaching students how to do proofs. Such
essential proof techniques as conditional proof, proof by contradiction, proof
by cases, and so on, which are the bread and butter of ordinary mathematical
argumentation, are generally overlooked in favor of rules which are easier to
treat from the standpoint of metalogic. What is needed in order to teach
students how to write valid proofs is an emphasis upon logic as the underlying
theory of mathematical argumentation, not the logicist emphasis upon logic as
the content of the foundation of mathematics, nor the formalist emphasis upon
logic as the tool for investigating its foundations. Natural deduction
systems are called for which pay less attention to metatheory and more
attention to ordinary mathematical argumentation. Tautologies and truth
tables should be moved off center stage, and they should not be construed as
the basis for admitting a rule of inference. An appropriate deduction system
should be placed in the spotlight, so that students can learn the rich variety
of proof strategies available to them.
It is my belief that this is the correct route to take in teaching
mathematical proof construction. Leaving students to pick up the art of proof
making by osmosis signals our failure as teachers of mathematics. We ought to
address this issue instead in the spirit of De Morgan, using logic to learn
the tools of proof making. We now have the logical equipment he lacked: a
wonderful analysis of sentence structure, deriving from the work of Boole and
Frege on sentential and predicate logic; and a natural deduction system,
deriving in part from Gentzen's work in proof theory but more importantly from
the work of Jaskowski on natural deduction, both dating from around 1934
(going into these developments would require another talk, which I'm not yet
prepared to give). Natural deduction systems have existed now for around 50
years; they have been incorporated in a number of philosophical logic
textbooks for over 30 years. It's high time the mathematical community
familiarizes itself with them and makes use of them to construct a textbook
teaching students how to read and write mathematical proofs.
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